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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Ordinarily, the officer making the arrest in speeding cases is the
officer who personally clocked the speed of the violator and no question
arises as to the offense having been committed in his presence. How-
ever, with the use of the speedmeter, the general practice is for the
officer reading the indicator not to pursue an offender. Rather, he relays
by radio the description of the speeding car, with or without the license
number to a second officer who stops the car when it reaches his post
or station.35 This second officer makes the arrest or issues the sum-
mons without a warrant and without having witnessed the crime.
. Even here no problem would seem to arise if the second officer only
issues a summons and does not detain the motorist further if the sum-
mons is refused, as the issuance of a summons is not an arrest.80 If,
however, the motorist refuses to accept the summons, his arrest by the
officer would seem to be unlawful.
In conclusion it may be said that in the absence of a showing of
general scientific acceptance, appellate courts would probably refuse to
admit testimony founded upon information obtained by the use of the
radar speedmeter. It would also appear that evidence based upon the
device may not be given the probative value conceded to certain other
scientific devices because the limited training course may prevent the
operator from qualifying as an expert witness in radar. Furthermore,
the arrest procedure now generally used in connection with the machine
does not seem to meet the strict requirements of the North Carolina
law of arrest.
J. KENNETH LEE.
Bankruptcy-Discharge of judgments Arising Out of
Automobile Accident Suits
When a money judgment is obtained for damages resulting from an
automobile accident, and the judgment debtor is subsequently declared
bankrupt, a difficult question is frequently presented. Does the judg-
ment survive the bankruptcy proceedings or is the judgment debtor
discharged?
Section 17(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Act' provides that:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts,2 whether allowable in full or in part, except such as
15N. Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1950, p. 17, col. 4; Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News,
Aug. 19, 1951, §4, p. 1, col. 1; personal observation by writer of speedmeter in
actual operation in Greensboro, N. C., and Winston-Salem, N. C.
" MACHEN, THE LAW OF ARREST 8 (1950).
130 STAT. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §35 (Supp. 1951).
2 It must be borne in mind that non-provable claims are never dischargeable.
In order to be provable, a claim arising out of an automobile accident must be
rediced to judgment before the filing bf the petition in bankruptcy, or the action
must be instituted prior to and pending at the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §103 (Supp. 1951).
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* . .are liabilities . . .for willful and malicious injuries to the person
or property of another." The United States Supreme Court has not
yet directly answered the question of what constitutes a "willful and
malicious injury," and has delegated to the various state courts the duty
of interpretation of the effect of an order of discharge in bankruptcy.
3
It is universally held that liability for simple negligence in the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle which results in an injury to another is not
excepted from a discharge in bankruptcy as a "willful and malicious"
injury.4 Moreover, it is also well settled that liability arising out or
clearly intentional injury is not discharged.5 However, the courts have
disagreed as to whether liability for injury resulting from acts of a
character greater than simple negligence, yet short of intentional injury,
is discharged in bankruptcy.
A majority of the courts,6 influenced by a dictum of the Supreme
Court in Tinker v. Colwell,7 have adopted the theory that no degree of
negligence can produce a "willful and malicious injury" as contemplated
by the Bankruptcy Act. Although this dictum was handed down long
before reckless driving of automobiles became a public menace, and at
a time when the court could only have had in mind the negligent opera-
'Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234 (1934); Harrison v. Donnelly, 153
F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946). While the Federal Court has paramount jurisdiction
of the matter, and may, if it so desires, assume jurisdiction, it has been the an-
nounced policy of the United States Supreme Court to permit the federal courts
to exercise jurisdiction only where unusual circumstances are present.
' Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; In re Kubiniec, 2 F.
Supp. 632 (W. D. N. Y. 1932); In re Madigan, 254 Fed. 221 (S. D. N. Y.
1918) ; Bissing v. Turkington, 113 Conn. 737, 157 Atl. 226 (1931); Bielawski v.
Nicks, 290 Mich. 401, 287 N. W. 560 (1939); Wyka v. Benedicts, 226 App. Div.
1025, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 907 (1943) ; Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S. W.
2d 664 (1947) ; Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519 (1918).
In re Wegner, 88 F. 2d 899 (7th Cir. 1937); fi re Phillips, 298 Fed. 135
(S. D. Ohio 1924) ; It re Wilson, 296 Fed. 845 (D. Md. 1920) ; Rodgers v. Doody,
119 Conn. 532, 178 Atl. 51 (1935).
Rodgers v. Doody, 119 Conn. 532, 178 Atl. 51 (1935); Prater v. King, 73
Ga. App. 471, 37 S. E. 2d 155 (1946); Campbell v. Norgart, 73 N. D. 297, 14
N. W. 2d 260 (1944) ; Freedman v. Cooper, 126 N. J. L. 177, 17 A. 2d 609 (1941) ;
Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S. W. 2d 664 (1947) ; Panagopulas v.
Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P. 2d 614 (1937); Ely v. O'Dell, 146 Wash. 667, 246
Pac. 715 (1928) ; Francine v. Babayan, 45 F. Supp. 321 (E. D. N. Y. 1942) ; In re
Ellman, 48 F. Supp. 519 (W. D. N. Y. 1942); In re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877
(N. D. Ga. 1936); In re Longdo, 45 F. 2d 246 (N. D. N. Y. 1930); I1n re Vena,
46 F. 2d 81 (W. D. Wash. 1930); In re Phillips, 298 Fed. 135 (S. D. Ohio
1924) ; In re Roberts, 290 Fed. 257 (E. D. Mich. 1923) ; In re Wilson, 269 Fed.
845 (D. Md. 1920); Ex parte Harrison, 272 Fed. 543 (D. Mass. 1921); In re
Madigan, 254 Fed. 221 (S. D. N. Y. 1918). See Laugharn, The Effect of Dis-
charge it Bankruptcy Upon Automobile Accident Judgments, 281 INs. L. J. 394
(1946).
7 193 U. S. 473 (1904). "It is not necessary in the construction we give to the
language of the exception in the statute to hold that every willful act which is
wrong implies malice. One who negligently drives through a crowded thorough-
fare and negligently runs over an individual would not, as we suppose, be within
the exception. True he drives negligently, and that is a wrongful act, but he does
not intentionally drive over the individual."
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tion of the horse and buggy, it has been consistently cited as authority
for the discharge of automobile accident judgments. Under the Tinker
rule "not only the action producing the injury but the resulting injury
must in intentional. A willful and malicious injury is one caused by
design."' 8 But a "spirit of spite, hate and malevolence is not essential."
In recent years, however, there has been a distinct trend in state
and federal court decisions away from the dictum of the Tinker case. 10
As early as 1918 one state court 1 held that liability resulting from
a "wrongful act done intentionally and without cause or excuse falls
within the exception.'
2
Under this latter view "willful and malicious conduct" has been fre-
quently defined as "that degree of neglect arising where there is a reck-
less indifference to the safety of human life, or an intentional failure to
perform a manifest duty to the public. . ".."13 It is interesting to note
that while the courts which adopt this view necessarily repudiate the
Tinker dictum, they very frequently quote other language 14 contained
in the opinion in support of their position.1 Thus there are two groups
of authorities citing the same opinion as supporting opposite views.
Many of the opinions are confusing because courts following one
rule often cite and quote from cases based on the opposite view. 10 What
was said in regard to a particular fact situation, or as to words used
in a pleading or finding in a case decided under one view has no appli-
cation to a similar fact situation or to the meaning of those words in a
decision based on the other view. The meaning and effect of language
'Rodgers v. Doody, 119 Conn. 532, 178 AtI. 51 (1935).
'Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P. 2d 614 (1937).
10 Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946); Greenfield v. Tuccillo,
129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; In re Green, 87 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Fitz-
gerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 127, 177 P. 2d 364 (1947) ; Breitowich (Tharp) v.
Standard Process Corp., 323 Il. App. 261, 55 N. E. 2d 392 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U. S. 801 (1945) ; Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950) ; Mc-
Clure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N. W. 2d 153 (1949) ; Mockenhaupt v. Cordie,
181 Minn. 582, 233 N. W. 314 (1930); Wyka v. Benedicts, 266 App. Div. 1025,
44 N. Y. S. 2d 907 (1943); Doty v. Rodgers, 213 S. C. 361, 49 S. E. 2d 594
(1948) ; Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 AtI. 519 (1918) ; Saueressig v. Jung, 246
Wis. 82, 16 N. W. 2d 417 (1944).
"'Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519 (1918).
I2 d. at 521, 106 Atl. 519 (1918).
13 See, e.g., Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950) ; Reell v. Central
Illinois Electric and Gas Co., 317 Ill. App. 106, 45 N. E. 2d 500 (1942) ; It re
Dutkiewicz, 27 F. 2d 335 (W. D. N. Y. 1928).
"' "... [A] willful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an action
which is against good morals, and wrongful in and of itself, and which neces-
sarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully
and maliciously, so as to come within the exception." Tinker v. Colwell, 193
U. S. 473, 485, 487.
" See, e.g., Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Greenfield
v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; In re Green, 87 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir.
1937) ; Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 A. 519 (1918).
' See, e.g., In re Wegner, 88 F. 2d 899 (7th Cir. 1937) ; In re Kubiniec, 2 F.
Supp. 632 (W. D. N. Y. 1932).
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used in opinions depends wholly upon what has been said of its meaning
in other cases following the same view.
Under the more liberal view whether a particular claim arising out
of an automobile accident will be excepted from discharge depends, to
a large extent, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
the injury and the specific acts of misconduct charged against the tort-
feasor.17 Only those judgments survive discharge where the record of
the proceeding in which the judgment was rendered shows a sufficient
degree of negligence to come within the meaning of "willful and
malicious injury" as defined by the courts adopting this view.18 There is
by no means complete unanimity as to what type of conduct evidences this
degree of neglect. 9 However, as to several types of conduct there is
general agreement among these courts.
In most cases involving injuries arising out of automobile accidents
where it appeared that the bankrupt was guilty of drunken driving,
20
deliberately disregarding a traffic signal,2' driving his car on the side-
walk,22 driving on the wrong side of the road,23 or attempting to pass
17 In re Wegner, 88 F. 2d 899 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Breitowich (Tharp) v. Standard
Process Corp., 323 Ill. App. 261, 55 N. E. 2d 392 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S.
801 (1945) ; Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950) ; Ex Parte Cote,
93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519 (1918).
is Where the judgment is general in its terms, the court will ordinarily look
behind the judgment in order to ascertain whether the debt upon which it was
founded is excepted from discharge. McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N. W.
2d 153 (1949); Campbell v. Norgart, 73 N. D. 297, 14 N. W. 2d 260 (1944);
Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519 (1918). For such purpose it is proper to
consider and review the entire record of the proceedings in which the judgment
was rendered. In re Greene, 87 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Campbell v. Norgart,
73 N. D. 297, 14 N. W. 2d 260 (1944). There is also authority for the view that
the nature of a debt may be established by extrinsic evidence where the record is
not illuminating on this score. Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir.
1942) ; Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 127, 177 P. 2d 364 (1947).
Where the judgment is not general in its terms, ordinarily it must be accepted
as true for the purpose of determining whether the debt is within the exception
to discharge. In re Greene, 87 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937). Thus the verdict of
the jury or the findings of the trial court that the acts of the bankrupt on which
the judgment was based were done willfully and maliciously will in most cases
be binding. But cf. Crow v. McCullen, 235 N. C. 380, 70 S. E. 2d 198 (1952).
", Compare Bielawski v. Nicks, 290 Mich. 401, 287 N. W. 560 (1939), with
Saueressig v. Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N. W. 2d 417 (1944). See also Greenfield
v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942), and Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 265 App.
Div. 343, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 758 (1942).
"o Saueressig v. Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N. W. 2d 417 (1944) ; Harrison v. Don-
nelly, 153 F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946). But see Bielawski v. Nicks, 290 Mich. 401,
405, 287 N. W. 560, 561 (1939). Contra (following the Tinker dictum): In re
Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 977 (N. D. Ga. 1936) ; In re Wilson, 269 Fed. 845 (D. Md.
1920) ; Tippett v. Sylvester, 3 N. J. M. 125, 127 Ati. 321 (1925).
2 Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; Breitowich (Tharp)
v. Standard Process Corp., 323, Ill. App. 261, 55 N. E. 2d 392 (1944), cert denied,
323 U. S. 801 (1945). But cf. Wolkoff v. Minker, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 87 (1943).
Contra: In re Longdo, 45 F. 2d 246 (N. D. N. Y. 1930) (following the Tinker
dictum).
"McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N. W. 2d 153 (1949). Contra: Ii re
Gout, 88 Vt. 318, 92 At]. 646 (1914) (following the Tinker dictum).
"In re Dutkiewicz, 27 Fed. 2d 335 (W. D. N. Y. 1928) ; Ex parte Cote, 93
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another vehicle when it was impossible to see ahead,24 these courts have
held such injury "willful and malicious" within the meaning of the act.20
On the other hand, mere excessive speed, though willful, does not imply
malice, and there must be some other evidence of a reckless disregard
for the rights of others before speed can cause "willful and malicious"
injury.2 6 Where there is a combination of several of these factors there
is little chance that the liability will be discharged through bankruptcy
in a court following the liberal view.
2 7
As pointed out above, the larger number of cases, adhering to the
dictum of the Tinker case, have held that all automobile accident judg-
ments are dischargeable in bankruptcy. But in many of these cases it
appears that the judgments were only for simple negligence which would,
of course, be dischargeable under either view.28 If these courts are
faced with a situation involving gross negligence they might well adopt
the opposite view. Further, one court which felt bound by the Supreme
Court dictum has expressed disapproval of the results which it creates.29
In view of the conflicting theories adopted by the courts which have
faced this question, and in view of the fact that a majority of the state
courts (including North Carolina3 0 ) have not yet been presented with
this question, a decision by the Supreme Court clarifying this subject
is definitely needed.
In the absence of an authoritative decision by the Supreme Court
the courts have tended definitely away from the Tinker dictum. In the
Vt. 10, 106 At!. 519 (1918). But cf. Wyka v. Benedicts, 266 App. Div. 1025, 44
N. Y. S. 2d 907 (1943).
2' Margulies v. Garwood, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 946, 178 Misc. 970 (1942). Contra:
Bielawski v. Nicks, 290 Mich. 401, 287 N. W. 560 (1939) (following the liberal
rule). Bazemore v. Stephenson, 24 Ga. App. 180, 100 S. E. 234 (1919) ; Pozanovic
v. Gilardine, 174 Minn. 89, 218 N. W. 244 (1928); Randolph v. Edmonds, 185
Tenn. 37, 202 S. W. 2d 664 (1947) ; Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P.
2d 614 (1937).
2 It has been held that a criminal conviction, based on the same facts which
gave rise to the civil liability, does not necessarily prevent the discharge of the
judgment even where the defendant has pleaded guilty. Greenfield v. Tuccillo,
129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942)."Inrh re Greene, 87 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937).
"Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946); Rosen v. Shingleur,
47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950); Doty v. Rodgers, 213 S. C. 361, 49 S. E. 2d 594
(1948) (intoxicated, speeding, driving on wrong side of road).
2" See, e.g., In re Vena, 46 F. 2d 81 (W. D. Wash. 1930) ; In re Roberts, 290
Fed. 257 (E. D. Mich. 1923); Ex parte Harrison, 272 Fed. 543 (D. Mass. 1921).
" "If the court were permitted to do moral justice instead of legal justice it
would refuse to discharge the bankrupt of the judgments. There are too many
accidents resulting in judgments which are wiped out in bankruptcy. . . . In-
stance after instance can be pointed out of the injustice that is done to the victims
of auto accidents by virtue of the Bankruptcy Law." Francine v. Babayan, 45 F.
Supp. 321 (E. D. N. Y. 1942).
" In Gray v. Griffin, 215 N. C. 182, 1 S. E. 2d 361 (1939), the only North
Carolina case dealing with this question, this point was not before the court since




last few years most courts have chosen to follow the opposite view.31
This position would appear to be consistent with the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act,3 2 and in line with the policy of the Supreme Court in
upholding state "financial responsibility" statutes. These statutes sus-
pend a defendant's driver's license when a judgment obtained against
him in an automobile accident case remains unpaid, notwithstanding the
fact that the judgment debtor has obtained a discharge in bankruptcy.33
JOSEPH F. BOWEN, JR.
Bills and Notes-Purchaser in Good Faith and Without Notice
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and the New
Uniform Commercial Code
In a recent federal court case,' the court applied to an alleged bona
fide purchaser of stolen bearer bonds a rule taken from a New York
case:2 "Even if his [holder's] actual good faith is not questioned, if
the facts known to him should have led him to inquire, and by inquiry
he would have discovered the real situation, in a commercial sense he
acted in bad faith .... One who suspects [that there are infirmities
or defects in the instrument], or ought to suspect [italics added], is
bound to inquire and the law presumes that he knows whatever proper
inquiry would disclose." The purchaser was ruled not a holder in due
course.3 The instruments in question were four bearer bonds issued by
United States corporations. 4  They were taken from four Netherland
" See notes 5 and 9 supra.
"' To discharge "the honest debtor and not the malicious wrongdoer." Tinker
v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473 (1904).
"All but three states have some form of financial or safety responsibility
legislation. PRESIDENT's HIGHWAY SAFETY CONFERENCE, COMMITTEE LAWS AND
ORDINANcE REPORT (1949). See, e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §§20-224 through 279
(1947). The North Carolina Act expressly provides that a discharge in bank-
ruptcy of the judgment debtor is not to be treated as equivalent to payment of
the debt for purposes of the act. N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-244 (1947).
Thus under an act of this type the judgment creditor is either compelled to
waive the benefit accorded him by the discharge or accept the alternative of being
deprived of the privilege of operation of a motor vehicle. It was argued in the
case of Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U. S. 33 (1941), that this pressure brought about
by the financial responsibility law was repugnant to the purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and hence unconstitutional. This argument was rejected by the Supreme
Court of the United States in a 5-4 decision.
1 State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 99 F. Supp. 655,
667 (S. D. N. Y. 1951).Rochester and C. T. R. Co. v. Paviour, 164 N. Y. 281, 284, 58 N. E. 114, 115
(1900).
' It will be presumed throughout this note that the purchaser seeks recovery
from the drawer or maker of a negotiable instrument who has a valid defense of
fraud, ,duress, false representation, breach of warranty, etc., making it necessary
for the purchaser to prove he took the instrument in good faith and without notice
in order to be a holder in due course.
'The instruments in this case being bearer bonds, the same case arising under
the new Uniform Commercial Code would probably be decided under Article 8,
1952]
